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This paper seeks to explore the problems and potentialities of asymmetrical historical comparison 
by examining visits by heads of State to the provinces in Germany and France on the eve of WW I. 
This act of political legitimisation and representation is analysed through the lens of the practical 
organization of the event understood as an administrative routine, thereby bringing into question 
many of the categories routinely mobilised to describe and to oppose two models of national 
integration. 
 




Le présent article vise à approfondir les problèmes et les possibilités d’une comparaison historique 
asymétrique en se penchant sur les visites de chefs d’Etat dans les provinces allemandes et 
françaises dans la période précédant la première guerre mondiale. Cet acte de légitimation et de 
représentation politique est analysé à travers le prisme de l’organisation pratique de l’événement, 
vue comme une routine administrative, ce qui amène à se poser la question des catégories 
habituellement mobilisées pour décrire et opposer deux modèles d’intégration nationale. 
 
Mots-clés : visites de souveraineté, légitimité politique, intégration nationale, théorie comparative. 
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On October 18, 1913, Kaiser Wilhelm II 
travelled to Leipzig to preside over the 
inauguration of the Völkerschlachtdenkmal,1 a 
monument celebrating the centenary of the 
defeat of Napoleon’s Grande Armée in the 
fields outside Leipzig. The event closed a year 
of public celebrations including Wilhelm II’s 
silver jubilee, the wedding of Princess 
Viktoria Luise and the centenary of national 
liberation (Siemann 1988: 298-320). In 
Leipzig, the Kaiser was at the centre of the 
proceedings, but was accompanied by high-
ranking military officials and members of the 
government, as well as the king of Saxony 
and representatives of the royal families of 
Russia, Sweden and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Some 60,000 spectators paid between 
3 and 5 RM to witness the ceremony, and 
bleachers were put up to seat 4,800 people 
paying 100 RM each to get a good view of the 
event. In addition, tens of thousands of 
spectators thronged the avenues leading from 
the train station to the Völkerschlachtdenkmal 
to catch a glimpse of the Kaiser and his suite. 
That same year the French President, 
Raymond Poincaré, made multiple visits to 
French provinces. Poincaré laid the 
cornerstone for the new seaport at Le Havre 
and the tunnel of l’Estaque in Marseille and 
reviewed infantry and naval manoeuvres three 
                                                 
1
 This massive memorial of the “battle of the people” 
(Völkerschlacht) is 91 meters high and was designed 
by Bruno Schmitz. Its construction, which lasted from 
1900 to 1913 at a total cost of 6 million RM, was 
exclusively financed by private donations. 
times. Finally, he visited a number of petites 
patries, paying tribute to the local costumes, 
scenic sights and gastronomic specialties of 
each area, as had his predecessors and 
successors. As was the case for the visit of 
Wilhelm II to Leipzig, these presidential visits 
mobilised a considerable number of people - 
between 10,000 and 20,000 in small cities and 
between 40,000 and 100,000 in larger prefect 
towns. In Germany, as in France, a series of 
festivities and attractions accompanied the 
official visits. Fireworks, urban decorations, 
nocturnal illuminations, concerts, 21 gun 
salutes, peeling church bells and street theatre 
transformed ordinary sensorial perceptions of 
the city and lent an extraordinary character to 
the visit (Corbin/Gérôme 1994). Local elites 
were responsible for mobilising the 
population, which often included leading 
them to the sites of the sovereign’s visit. The 
role of schoolchildren in particular is a classic 
example. In Leipzig, 27,000 schoolchildren 
were posted along the 1.5 miles of the route 
from the train station to the memorial to 
acclaim the Kaiser and were expected to 
remain in place for two hours for his return 
after the ceremony. Similarly, during the visit 
of Poincaré to Le Havre in 1913, the 
municipal administration and regional school 
authority joined forces to organise the rational 
deployment of children along the path taken 
by the President. 
In both cases, the explicit objective of 
the official visit was to reinforce the popular 
legitimacy of the head of State and to 
demonstrate the strong ties between the 
territory being visited and the nation as a 
 GSPE Working Papers – Nicolas MARIOT & Jay ROWELL – 1/5/2009 3 
whole. In Germany, the organizers of the 
imperial visit felt challenged to “create a 
ceremony which needs to be pious in nature, 
yet at the same time expresses loyalty and 
love for the king [of Saxony] and the Land, as 
well as enthusiasm and devotion to the Reich 
and its Kaiser.”2 In France, the visits of heads 
of State in the provinces were considered by 
their promoters and the presidents themselves 
as an effective institution for integrating 
subnational territories into the nation-state 
through direct contact with the population. 
These visits were thus integral parts of the 
process of national legitimisation3 and served 
to reinforce the institution of the presidency, 
as is well demonstrated in the following 
passage from a 1913 essay by a journalist and 
supporter of French presidential visits: “The 
President travels because he needs to maintain 
a direct line of communication between 
himself and the country in order to create a 
current of sympathy between those who 
govern and those who are governed, to 
maintain the affection of the masses, their 
confidence. This depends on the powers of 
seduction of the supreme chief of the nation, 
and is a duty and a vitally important task 
which the President must fulfil.” (Leyret 
1913: 100) 
In both contexts, visits by heads of 
State became increasingly important if 
measured by the number of visits, the size of 
the public mobilised, and the amount of press 
coverage. The similarities between the 
objectives and outcomes of provincial visits 
by the heads of State make a comparative 
framework of analysis appear both natural and 
evident, following the classical method of 
establishing a “catalogue” of similarities and 
differences, convergences and divergences. 
This perspective would imply that the 
evolution of the institution responded to 
similar challenges confronting each polity and 
would be part of a policy of national 
                                                 
2
 Minutes of a preparatory meeting held on March 14, 
1913 in Dresden. Municipal archives of Leipzig, 
hereafter MA Leipzig, Kap 71/63/1. 
3
 We will not touch the question of the evaluation of 
the effects of the visits here. On this point, see Mariot 
2001: 707-738.  
integration allowing both societies to confront 
“radical changes without falling into a 
situation of anomie” (Thiesse 1999: 16). In 
this regard, the German Kaiser began regular 
public and highly publicised trips to the 
Prussian provinces to direct military 
manoeuvres in the 1860s, before venturing 
further throughout the Reich after 1876 where 
he could see and be seen by increasingly large 
crowds turning out to see the two to four 
military manoeuvres which the German 
Kaiser directed each year in the regional 
military districts (Vogel 1997: 42-91). With 
Wilhelm II, the number of voyages and public 
appearances on the international stage 
(Paulmann 2000) as well as on the national 
stage grew to such an extent, that John Röhl 
speaks of the “desire by a charismatic 
monarchy […] to transform the monarchy 
into the institution monopolising the idea of 
the empire through its public omnipresence, 
the multiplication of speeches, parades, 
inaugurations and commemorative 
ceremonies” (Röhl 1988: 112). In France, the 
number of presidential visits to the provinces 
rose dramatically at the end of the 1880s, 
during the consolidation of the young Third 
Republic challenged by the Boulangiste 
movement. Over more than two years, 
President Sadi Carnot and General Boulanger 
“duelled” at a distance, each crisscrossing the 
national territory, emulating mobilisation 
techniques and rallying personal and 
institutional support. Following the “victory” 
of the Republic, the presidents never ceased 
their frequent travels through the national 
territory and were explicit about the objective 
of “conquering hearts and minds to the form 
of government which our nation has freely 
given itself.”4 
If both nations faced similar 
challenges in confronting the centrifugal 
effects of the tremendous economic, social 
and political upheavals, an enormous body of 
research on both countries which could be 
mobilised to explain differences observed in 
                                                 
4
 Quotation from the Petit Dauphinois, August 16, 
1914 referring to the cancelled visit of Poincaré to 
Haute-Savoie. 
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the institutional and practical responses to 
these challenges —with respect to either each 
case, or a common norm— including 
institutional differences (e.g., monarchy vs. 
republic, strong Jacobin centralisation vs. 
weak central State), differences in the history 
of the construction of each nation-state, and 
differing conceptions of the nation. These 
oppositions constructed around the 
comparison of France and Germany as 
opposing and emblematic models of nation 
and State building structure many of the 
theories and cognitive frameworks used to 
study the nation (Didry/Wagner/Zimmermann 
1999). 
To get around the pitfalls of a 
functionalist reading which would tend to 
transform official visits to the provinces as a 
necessary condition to the stability of the 
political order and the integration of 
peripheral territories and populations into the 
nation, while at the same time avoiding the 
risks of reproducing crystallized oppositions 
of the two nations by projecting nationally 
anchored categories of interpretation from one 
context to another (see Tacke 1995: 14), our 
research was built around two methodological 
principles: 1) continuous control of categories 
and scales of analysis exercised by shuttling 
findings and queries from one context to the 
other.5 2) first consider the object “visits of 
heads of State” in and of itself, by 
understanding the internal mechanisms of its 
existence, its organisation, the terms of the 
negotiation between central and local actors 
before bringing in more interpretative 
questions. 
The combination of an inductive 
approach and the interweaving of the two 
contexts appeared necessary to respond to an 
epistemological problem inherent to the 
cognitive operation of comparing: the 
problem of asymmetry. During the 
construction of the comparison, as in the 
interpretative phase, there is a fundamental 
asymmetry between the degree of knowledge 
                                                 
5
 On this interweaving of scales, questions and 
categories as a method of historical comparison, see 
Werner/Zimmermann 2006: 30-50. 
and the analytical categories that the historian 
can mobilise for each context or object 
studied. As a consequence, comparison 
implies a controlled (or in most cases 
uncontrolled) transposition of analytical or 
conceptual categories from one context to 
another as a way of constructing a common 
scale of comparison and ordering empirical 
observations are “similar” or “different”. As 
Jocelyne Dakhlia notes, 
 
“A comparative perspective is in reality always 
asymmetric, founded on a pre-existing object, 
solidly constructed and ready for use, which is 
subsequently brought into contact which a new 
and, at face value, similar object. The intuition 
of an analogy, the idea that a phenomenon of 
the same order can be observed on two sides of 
a political, cultural or religious border, is 
nothing other than a form of annexation. 
Whether one sides in the end of the enquiry with 
the interpretation of similarity or difference, the 
fact remains that at the start, one always 
compares an object which one knows less, little, 
or even nothing about when compared with an 
object which is already known.” (Dakhlia 
1995:44) 
 
If asymmetry and the logic of transposition 
are integral to the operation of comparison, 
how can their effects be controlled so as to 
avoid the pitfalls of a functionalist reading of 
the visits of sovereignty (that is, as fulfilling 
the same necessary social and political 
functions) on one hand, or essentialist pitfalls 
consisting in attributing differences to 
irreconcilable and unchanging national 
cultures or trajectories on the other? 
Concretely, the first stage of the 
analysis consisted in studying the 
organization and the structure of visits of 
sovereignty in Germany, following a set of 
criteria developed in the French context 
(exploring, for example: What happened? 
Who organized the event? How many people 
turned out? What did the head of State see 
and do?).6 After presenting the results of our 
                                                 
6
 The general idea was to reintroduce a logic of “thick 
description” into the social and institutional aspects of 
ceremonial techniques which are all too often reduced 
to the analysis of their function (e.g., What is their role 
in society?), their signification (e.g., Which cultural or 
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initial “checklist”, we will show how the 
realization that certain “items” were simply 
not found in the German context enabled us to 
reconsider what we had initially taken as a 
given, question our initial categories of 
analysis, and hence adjust the initial “Franco-
centric” framework via the German 
comparison. In this way our approach neither 
seeks to neutralize national bias by fixing an 
independent yardstick of measurement, no in 
transposing one set of analytical categories 
from one context to the other. Rather, we 
suggest that a continual process of 
readjustment of analytical categories through 
a confrontation of empirical findings is the 
soundest way to address the problem of 
asymmetry in national comparisons. 
 
 
I - Visits of sovereignty as a way to 
articulate the national and the local 
 
The visit of Wilhelm II to Leipzig on October 
18, 1913 was planned as early as January 
1912. In the first months of 1913, the mayor 
of Leipzig proposed a program to the imperial 
court in Berlin. The program detailed an 
extremely dense plan of activities associating 
the Kaiser with events which promoted the 
image of the city: following the inauguration 
of the Völkerschlachtdenkmal in the morning, 
Leipzig’s proposal included the festive 
opening the construction industry’s 
international exposition, inaugurating the 
Russian memorial church (commemorating 
the alliance of Russia with Prussia during the 
Napoleonic wars), and posing the cornerstone 
of the German national library. These events 
were to be followed by a reception, a banquet, 
a visit of the new and imposing town hall, and 
finally a festive closing of the day through the 
Kaiser’s presence at the theatre in the evening 
and an ensuing fireworks display.7 This 
                                                                            
symbolic system do they reflect or set into action?) 
without first understanding the social logics 
contributing to their realization. For a similar approach, 
see Tacke, op. cit. 
7
 Proposition of the mayor of Leipzig, dated February 
22, 1913, MA Leipzig, Stal, Kap 71/63/1. 
program associated Wilhelm II with symbols 
of Leipzig’s national and international 
reputation as a centre for trade shows and the 
German book industry, as well as music and 
culture and demonstrates that visits of 
sovereignty were also occasions for the self-
representation of local elites and the symbols 
of their contribution to the national edifice.8 
In the end, however, officials in charge of 
Wilhelm’s court protocol unilaterally imposed 
a much lighter program. The inauguration of 
the Völkerschlachtdenkmal was to be the 
highpoint of the day, with the inauguration of 
the Russian memorial church lasting only 10 
minutes and “symbolically separate and of 
secondary importance”; the rest of Leipzig’s 
proposed program was eliminated, with the 
exception of the reception and the banquet at 
the new town hall.9 Court authorities focused 
their energies on the minute organization of 
the inauguration ceremony, including the 
choice of prayers, hymns and three speakers 
and the timing of the cannon salutes and 
peeling church bells. Crowd control on the 
grounds of the monument and ticket sales 
were largely delegated to the “German 
Patriotic Union for the edification of a 
memorial of the Völkerschlacht”, which had 
financed the monument.10 
In addition to imposing a reduced 
program, strictly limiting the amount of time 
William II was to appear in public, the court 
also imposed the shortest possible route from 
the train station to the site of the ceremony, 
the rationalization of the security 
arrangements being evoked as the official 
reason.11 No effort was made to pass before 
                                                 
8
 For a similar perspective in Tsarist Russia, see 
Worton 1990: 745-771. 
9
 Definitive program dated March 10, 1913, signed von 
Burgsdorff, MA Leipzig, StaL, Kap 71/63/1. 
10
 With its 45,000 members, the Union commissioned 
and financed the monument under the patronage of 
Wilhelm II. 
11
 Besides the more than 1.000 policemen and 516 
voluntary security forces recruited from gymnastic 
associations on the grounds of the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal, 975 policemen on foot, 240 
equestrian policemen and two companies of the army 
ensured for security along the route from the train 
station to the memorial. In addition, 600 municipal 
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important public buildings or businesses, and 
the itinerary did not involve a visit of 
different neighbourhoods of the city, as was 
systematically the case in France. The Kaiser 
was not to visit the city, but rather simply to 
cross it; his Phaeton à la Daumont was even 
exchanged for an automobile after the 
ceremony, in order to accelerate the trip to the 
Russian memorial church and meal at the 
town hall.12 
Although one can also note an 
asymmetry in the power relations between 
central authorities and local representatives in 
France, this asymmetry is of another order. 
The Parisian promoters and organizers of the 
visits (the Maison militaire of the Elysée 
palace in charge of organization, Parisian 
journalists accompanying the President in an 
accredited press pool, etc.) recognized the 
French President’s visits to the provinces as 
routine activities. Nevertheless, each visit to 
the provinces required that it be perceived as 
“extraordinary,” and much of the preparation 
was left to local authorities under the 
supervision of the Prefect.13 This structure of 
negotiation, which left a large margin for 
local initiatives, was based on a shared 
understanding of what constituted a 
“successful” presidential visit, for both the 
presidency and local elites, as Elysée 
directives concerning the organization of 
presidential visits through “local committees” 
demonstrate: 
 
“The local committees are headed by the 
Prefect and are comprised of an officer of the 
Maison militaire of the Elysée, representatives 
of the military and the gendarmerie, and the 
mayor. The officer makes known the 
amendments to the program proposed by the 
representative of the inviting territory, following 
                                                                            
employees were paid 5 RM each to line the entire 
parade route, one posted every 10 meters. STal Kap II, 
71/63/1. and STal Kap II, 71/63 annexe 2 “Plan for the 
distribution of municipal volunteers along the parade 
route” July 12, 1913. 
12
 The “speed” of this secondary visit was so great, that 
the Kaiser arrived at the town hall half an hour ahead 
of schedule, placing the Mayor in an embarrassing 
situation, as their welcome was not up to the dignity 
that such an important visit required. 
13
 On these questions, see Mariot 2002 : 79-96.  
the instructions of the general in charge of the 
Maison militaire. It is the duty of the officer to 
communicate these amendments with the 
greatest possible tact and courtesy, in order to 
avoid disappointment, as the local authorities 
and their populations are all the more sensitive 
because they have often made proposals with 
great enthusiasm and zeal. Should these 
authorities insist nonetheless on maintaining the 
propositions to be amended, it is the duty of the 
officer to understand all the implications of the 
suppression of given parts of the program 
before reporting back to his commanding officer 
for further instructions.”14 
 
The notes of officers reporting on discussions 
in local committees testify to the margins of 
freedom conceded to local authorities. Edouard 
Herriot, mayor of Lyon, for example, 
succeeded in getting President Poincaré to 
“halt in front of a block of public housing and 
lay a bouquet of flowers [there]”. The language 
used in some of the requests show how far 
locally proposed initiatives could go. For the 
same visit to Lyon, Herriot stated that, 
following the banquet at the town hall, “it will 
be asked of Monsieur le President to step out 
onto the balcony and greet the crowd.”15 
This relatively great capacity for 
negotiation was not limited to major cities, or 
to mayors with connections in Paris. It was 
often the case that mayors of small towns 
complained about the route taken by the 
President when it passed through areas where it 
would be difficult to mobilize the population, 
as they feared that people would lose interest in 
the event if the President seemed to be 
avoiding their neighbourhoods. For example, 
in 1913 a municipal councillor of Saint-Céré 
requested a change in the official itinerary, as it 
“follow[ed] a route which is hardly inhabited, 
which would be difficult to decorate properly 
and where the President would only receive a 
meager tribute and welcome. We would like, 
and the whole population of Saint-Céré would 
like, to give the President the spontaneous and 
                                                 
14
 Dossier entitled “Préparation d’un voyage 
presidentiel”, undated, but from 1914. French National 
Archives (hereafter NA) 1N 1AG71. 
15
 “Report on the subject of the reconnaissance voyage 
to Lyon”, dossier “Voyage de Poincaré à Lyon”, NA 
1AG15. 
 GSPE Working Papers – Nicolas MARIOT & Jay ROWELL – 1/5/2009 7 
warm welcome he so deserves, but for this the 
President must consent to follow a more 
densely inhabited route.”16 
The general topography of the route 
chosen thus illustrates the essential role of 
local representatives in the organization of 
French presidential visits. These itineraries do 
not reflect a logic favouring the most “noble” 
or noteworthy parts of the city. There is no 
attempt to exclude poorer neighbourhoods 
from the gaze of the head of state17, nor do the 
itineraries seek to join two points in the most 
direct way. On the contrary, the French 
President’s route allowed him to “inspect” as 
much of the locality as possible, in such a way 
as to represent the imbrications of different 
territorial units, expressing the overlapping of 
the national with the local, and of the local 
with the national. During the visit of Sadi 
Carnot to Nancy in 1892, for example, the 
President and his entourage visited all eight 
administrative zones of the city and passed 
under its eight monumental arches, as well as 
eighteen arches made for the occasion by 
neighbourhood committees, associations and 
businesses. In theory, no monument, no 
neighbourhood, nor important business could 
be excluded, as the organizing principle of the 
visit was to reflect the equality and diversity of 
the territory. 
 
The logistics of mobilizing local society 
 
 The encounter of the head of State with 
crowds in public spaces posed a series of 
practical and organizational problems: How 
can court or Presidential protocol which rigidly 
defined social hierarchies be reconciled with 
events drawing thousands of undifferentiated 
members of the public. If this first problem 
                                                 
16
 Letter of a municipal counsellor of Saint-Céré dated 
August 22, 1913 sent to the director of presidential 
protocol of the Maison militaire. Dossier “Voyage de 
tourisme en Limousin”, NA 1AG13. 
17
 The itinerary chosen by the imperial court in 
Germany in Leipzig passed through a densely 
populated working-class neighbourhood and care was 
taken “in the decoration for the Reitzenheiner Strasse 
to try to hide its less attractive portions from the sight 
of the important guests”. “Plan for the decoration of the 
parade route” July 21, 1913. STal Kap II, 71/63/2 
could be solved by varying the physical and 
social distance of the encounter at different 
moments of the visit, a second, more difficult 
problem confronted organizers of the visits. 
How could it be ensured that crowds would 
turn out for the event and act on “cue” in the 
presence of the Head of State? 
 The differences in the itineraries and 
the way in which they were negotiated are an 
initial clue to differences in the logistics of 
mobilizing local society to acclaim the head of 
State, for much of the seemingly 
undifferentiated public was comprised of pre-
formed collectives mobilized for the occasion. 
Several weeks after the stop in Saint-Céré, a 
letter from the Prefect of Lot-et-Garonne 
relayed a request formulated by the mayor of 
Agen, who sought to lengthen the route taken 
by the President to include a “neglected” 
neighbourhood: “the morale of the Pine 
neighbourhood, densely inhabited and full of 
shopkeepers, would be terribly affected if they 
were left out of the president’s itinerary.”18 
Aside from such explicit arguments, extolling 
the supposed effects of the absence of the 
President on morale, the mayor had much more 
prosaic concerns: namely, for the presidential 
visit to be a success, he needed the local 
business community to pay for the decorations, 
as well as for the local population to turn out. 
Representatives of local economic interests 
were therefore highly implicated in the 
preparations for these visits. For example, the 
Rennes chamber of commerce asked its 
members to fly flags, decorate their shops and 
put flowers on their balconies, or to join 
together, street by street, to transform the city 
for the visit of Poincaré in 1914. For workday 
visits, it was regular practice for large-scale 
employers to give their workers a few hours off 
with pay—on condition that the workers were 
present when the President passed by the 
enterprise or the symbolic arch paid for by the 
entrepreneur. Sometimes the municipality 
accorded shopkeepers special opening times on 
a Sunday, in an effort to stimulate the 
                                                 
18
 Letter of the prefecture of Lot-et-Garonne to the 
secretary general of the Presidency dated September 2, 
1913. NA 1AG13. 
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decorative ardour of local businesses.19 While 
the participation of businesses in the festivities 
had clear economic motives, these motives 
were also perfectly compatible with the 
interests of local government and the 
Presidency. As a result, neither the town 
councils nor the presidency sought to rein in 
any local initiatives; on the contrary, the 
“spontaneous” participation of businesses, 
associations and neighbourhood committees 
generated a dynamic mobilization necessary to 
the transformation of the Presidential visit into 
an extraordinary event. 
Returning to the German example, the 
mobilization of Leipzig’s population in 1913 
followed a quite different pattern. Although the 
Association of House and Property Owners 
gave instructions to its members to place flags 
on their buildings and to distribute candles to 
tenants to be placed in all windows to 
illuminate the city after nightfall, major 
business interests and shopkeepers associations 
were neither included in negotiating the route 
to be taken by the Kaiser, nor in the 
organization of the day. Nationalist and 
conservative associations of shopkeepers and 
small enterprises called on its members to 
refrain from working on the 18th of October 
and calls were made to boycott shops 
remaining open. However, none of these 
initiatives were officially supported by 
municipal authorities. In addition, contrary to 
French practice, Leipzig businesses did not 
participate in decorating the city nor did 
industrialists give their workers a day off to 
participate in the day’s activities. The few 
offers of participation emanating from 
businesses were in fact met with scepticism by 
city officials; when the owner of the large steel 
company Köting und Mathiesen proposed to 
direct powerful spotlights from its main 
chimney onto the tower of the new town hall 
two kilometres away, city officials refused the 
proposal, arguing that the initiative would 
“dilute the effect of the illumination of the city 
                                                 
19
 Brochure of the Union of commerce and industry of 
Rennes, May 1914, n°5, NA 1AG15. 
centre.”20 In addition, a request sent to the city 
for help in the distribution and sale of a Jubilee 
book, presented as a “real commemorative 
Volksbuch” for the edification of the masses 
was refused on the basis that the city refused to 
associate itself with commercial interests 
surrounding the event. 
In the end, the city alone carried the 
responsibility and costs for the festive 
transformation of the city. A substantial budget 
of 160,000 RM was voted to decorate the city 
with flowers and the flags of the city, the Land 
of Saxony and the German Reich21. The 
juxtaposition of flags and colours, specially-
made plaster columns crowned by the Reich 
eagle and stylized, bronze-plated lions 
symbolizing the city were positioned in central 
squares and along the main route from the 
station to the of the Völkerschlacht memorial 
and sought to produce a visual illustration of 
the symbolic symbiosis between the three 
territorial units. A fireworks display was timed 
to coincide with the end of the theatre 
production, where many members of the royal 
courts of the Reich and Saxony—but not the 
Kaiser—were present. As in France, such 
spectacularly orchestrated sights (fireworks, 
illuminations, the imposing sight of the Kaiser 
surrounded by an Uhlan regiment, etc…) and 
sounds (fireworks, cheering crowds, hymns, 
music, gun salutes and peeling church bells) 
were an integral part of the pomp and 
extraordinary nature of the events which 
increased the chances of large crowd turnout. 
Patriotic and nationalist associations, as 
well as veterans associations, student 
fraternities and gymnastics and other sports 
associations did participate in the day’s events 
by providing volunteers for crowd control, by 
mobilizing their members. Three thousand 
members of these associations grouped behind 
their standard bearers to form a parade 
                                                 
20
 Only the association of “nationally minded” 
shopkeepers called for a voluntary closure of shops to 
maximise public turnout for the event. One does not 
perceive the same level of mutually reinforcing 
interests between municipal interests and economic 
interest as in the French case. MA Leipzig, STaL, Kap 
71/63/3. 
21
 MA Leipzig, STaL, Kap 71/63/2. 
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(separate from the route taken by the Kaiser) to 
head for the commemorative ceremony on the 
morning of October 18, 1913. By entering the 
ceremony ground collectively with standard 
bearers, individuals were rewarded with a 
reduction on the price of entry (paying 3 RM 
instead of 5). If these collective means of 
mobilization were similar to the French 
example, it was the national chapters of these 
associations which paraded—without any prior 
agreement with city officials—and not the 
local chapters. 
In France, the mobilization of crowds 
was also largely a collective affair, as the 
President was most often acclaimed by pre-
formed “collectives” organized and positioned 
well in advance of the event. In contrast to the 
German example, it was rarely, if ever the 
national federations, but rather countless local 
associations which organized the acclamation, 
especially the omnipresent brass bands which 
were often perceived as true “emanations” of 
local society (Farcy 1995). In 1913, President 
Poincaré reviewed numerous parades which 
comprised of all that local society could 
present as typical or representative of itself.22 
The only exception to this rule was the annual 
“federal celebration” of the Union of French 
Gymnastics Societies held on Easter weekend 
and visited regularly by heads of State. In this 
case, national federations and student 
fraternities were on display and organized the 
festivities. These events were characterized by 
parades with banners, flags and a general 
military allure, similar to the conservative and 
nationalist parade held in Leipzig on the 
morning of October 18, 1913, but not seen by 
Wilhelm II. Despite similarities, in the French 
case national associations maintained much 
closer ties with local authorities where the 
events were being held, giving even these 
“national” celebrations a distinct local or 
regional flavour largely absent from the 
German example. 
 
                                                 
22
 “City of Bar-le-Duc, celebrations in honor of the 
visit of M. Poincaré, President of the Republic. 
Programme”, visit of August 17, 1913. NA 1AG12. 
Making local hierarchies visible…and 
invisible 
 
 French presidential visits were not 
limited to a face-to-face encounter between the 
President and the crowds turning out to 
acclaim him. These visits were also 
characterized by multiple receptions, banquets 
and meals in the presence of local 
representatives whose place was strictly 
codified by protocol. Each visit to the capital 
of a département, for example, entailed an 
official reception in which the totality of the 
departmental civil service presented its homage 
to the head of state: the Prefect first and 
foremost, followed by elected officials 
(members of the national assembly, senators, 
department executives),23 and then by military 
representatives, judicial officials, and so on. 
The mayor of the locality arrived in 11th place, 
after the representatives of larger territorial 
units; at the same time, the mayor was always 
present and considered the host of the visit. 
This explains why socialist mayors, such as 
those in the Limousine, were included in the 
official ceremonies in France,24 contrary to 
social-democratic members of the Reichstag in 
Leipzig, as we shall see. 
 The order of the official parade gave 
another clear indication of the importance of 
municipal power in France. During Poincaré’s 
visit to Montpellier in March 1913, as for any 
other official visit, the host mayor was seated 
in the Daumont carriage with the President, the 
President of the Département and the Chief of 
the maison militaire of the Elysée. Other 
important figures, such as the Minister of 
Labour, the Prefect and members of the 
national assemblies followed in the other 
carriages, the six last carriages being reserved 
for the accredited press corps travelling with 
the President. 
                                                 
23
 The elected functions were introduced by the reform 
of the protocol of 1907. 
24
 Although socialist elected officials generally turned 
up at the strictly codified receptions, they often 
manifested their hostility to the Republic and the 
President by boycotting the rest of the presidential visit 
or refusing to vote budgets to prepare for the festivities. 
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Finally, it is interesting to note that over 
and above the list of official representatives, 
nearly every reception included the possibility 
for “orders, corporations, associations or 
societies of different natures to welcome the 
head of state,” once authorized by the Prefect. 
These “social delegations” varied greatly, but 
were always inscribed in the locality. In 
contrast to the official representatives, 
however, these groups were not differentiated 
or hierarchized by order of importance, and 
were simply to “wait in a special room where 
the President would greet them after the 
official receptions.” 
The invitations to the banquet in Leipzig 
following the official ceremony on October 
18, 1913 can also be seen as a materialization 
of the social and political hierarchy imposed 
by the court protocol of Berlin. Once again in 
contrast to the French case, however, the 
identity and titles of the guests demonstrate 
the marginalization of local representatives 
and, more generally, of elected officials. Of 
the 281 places at the table, 72 were reserved 
for foreign dignitaries, members of the 
imperial court and representatives of the 
courts of the German states. A further twelve 
seats went to members of the court of Saxony, 
five to the Bundesrat and 33 to members of 
the municipal council. If the elected officials 
of the municipality and the Saxon Bundesrat 
were relatively numerous, the protocol 
imposed by Berlin totally excluded elected 
members of the Reichstag, who were nearly 
all members of the SPD.25 Although the city 
disposed of 45 additional seats, to be 
distributed at its discretion, even here the 
accent was placed on seating representatives 
of national organizations, including: the 
Patriotenbund (7), the architects of the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal and the Russian 
                                                 
25
 The electoral system in place since 1818, based on 
property ownership, excluded the SPD from the city 
council, and the Landtag. The principle of “one man, 
one vote” held only for Reichstag elections, and the 
SPD totaled nearly 60% of the vote in this social-
democratic bastion; due to the fragmentation of the 
liberal and conservative camps, nearly all Reichstag 
representatives from the city were members of the 
SPD. 
memorial church (3), the Congress of German 
Cities (3), the Union of German Cities (2), 
and the German Gymnastics Society. Only the 
local representatives of the religious 
communities (Catholic, Lutheran and Jewish), 
two representatives of the chamber of 
commerce, and two representatives of local 
sports associations were allowed into this 
closed circle.26 
In the French case, on can speak of a 
voluntary, if indirect, inclusion of the working 
classes, contrary to the German example, 
where little is done to encourage participation, 
other than the attraction of the extraordinary 
sights and sounds of the event. In France 
workers were present as employees of 
companies who had financed symbolic arches 
and were paid for standing by the arch to 
acclaim the President. But the President also 
paid tribute to the lower classes by not 
excluding them from parade routes, and the 
fact that the celebrations were free of charge 
inserted the presidential visits into a larger 
festive context which built on the repertoires 
of public celebrations by including fire works, 
street theatre, music and balls. This model of 
integration created a “horizontal” rather than 
“vertical” perception of national unity which 
assimilated the local with the people. In the 
words of Anne-Marie Thiesse: 
 
“The long history of French centralization 
created a geographic concentration of the 
summits of power (political, economic and 
cultural) and engendered a homology between 
the capital and positions of power in all 
domains on the one hand, and the local and the 
dominated positions on the other. Because of 
this, the people, in the social sense, became 
identified with the local. Celebrating the local 
and underscoring its position as the basic 
building block of the national, equated 
reaffirming the roots of the republican nation in 
its social substrate.” (Thiesse 1997: 5) 
 
By making the local the emanation of the 
people, Presidential visits and other 
institutions masked social cleavages or 
antagonisms between nationals and non-
                                                 
26
 List of invitations dated September 15, 1913. AM 
Leipzig, STaL, Kap 71/ 63/3. 
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nationals. Workers or non-nationals were not 
included as such, but as members of a 
profession when their representatives were 
received at the prefecture, or as employees of 
a factory having financed a symbolic arch. In 
the German case, there was neither a day off 
for the working class, and businesses and 
their workers were next to invisible during the 
events. While representatives of associations 
and corporations were present at the 
ceremony and the banquet, there was no 
superposition between the local and the 
people as is evident in the logic of the French 
visits. The question of popular participation 
was only evoked during a recurrent debate on 
the price of entry to the grounds of the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal. Contrary to the 
French case, where all events were free, entry 
to the ceremony grounds was allowed on 
payment of 5 RM, or 3 RM if the individual 
was part of an association arriving in closed 
ranks. After the announcement of the ticket 
prices, several critical articles and letters to 
the editor in the local press denounced the 
high price as a barrier to the participation of 
the working classes. Veterans associations in 
particular were highly critical of the 
measures, particularly as the trip to the fifty-
year anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig in 
1863 for destitute war veterans was paid by 
the organizers (Hoffmann 1995: 118). 
Criticisms were countered by developing 
moral arguments- that the working classes 
could restrict their intake of alcohol and 
tobacco to pay for the tickets, and above all 
that paid entry was democratic as “all 
Germans, whether wealthy or modest, can 
fulfil the conditions…. and all will pay their 
entry, as official invitations are not 
accepted”.27 Participation therefore required a 
sacrifice, and this sacrifice was a public 
demonstration of patriotism. 
 Striking in the itemized comparison of 
the two contexts are the differences in the 
journalistic accounts of the visits, and in 
particular the place occupied by the crowds. 
In France, press accounts place great 
emphasis on the reaction of the crowds 
                                                 
27
 Leipziger Tagesblatt, 26.3.1913. 2. 
turning out to greet and acclaim the President. 
Stories consistently evoked the throngs of 
spectators trying to catch a glimpse of the 
President, on the acclamations coming from 
the public, the songs and the music which 
demonstrated the spontaneity and enthusiasm 
of the population in the presence of the 
President. In the journalistic accounts of the 
visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Leipzig in 1913, 
crowds or collective behaviour are hardly 
mentioned. For example, in the many pages 
devoted to the event in the two days following 
the event the only one line was devoted to 
describing crowd reaction: “Many thousands 
greeted the Kaiser with cries, applause and 
patriotic songs”.28 The account focuses on the 
gestures and expressions of the head of State, 
and no attempt was made to count or estimate 
the numbers of spectators, despite the fact that 
the numbers of tickets sold for the 
inauguration ceremony could have been easily 
found. The only exception to this rule was the 
social-democratic press which denounced the 
“orchestrated” nature of popular mobilization 
and therefore sought to unmask the 
techniques used to produce the appearance of 
popular support for the Emperor. In the 
October 14 1913 edition of the Leipziger 
Volkszeitung for example, one journalist 
covering the preparations of the event 
indicated that instructions had been given to 
members of patriotic, Heimat and musical 
associations to intermingle with the crowd on 
the parade route and initiate “spontaneous” 
songs, “hurrahs” and “long live the Emperor”. 
An article in the evening edition of October 
18, 1913 noted that the “hurrahs” were 
generally weak, that most members of the 
public didn’t recognize most of the people in 
the 122 horse-drawn carriages which paraded 
and the author regretted that he should have to 
“to write about the fools who are taken in by 
this national-patriotic circus”. If it was 
perfectly logical for the social-democratic 
press organs to argue that the support for the 
event was neither massive nor spontaneous, it 
                                                 
28
 The same phrase is used by the Leipziger 
Abendzeitung and the Leipziger Tagesblatt in their 
October 20, 1913 editions. 
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is surprising that none of the other 
newspapers produced detailed accounts of the 
massive popular support, thereby accrediting 
the popularity of the Kaiser and the patriotic 
fervour of the population. 
 Two explanations are possible: that 
the crowds were in effect relatively limited; 
that crowd turnout and reaction were not 
considered to form essential criteria to 
measure the success of the event. From 
archival sources, we know that a substantial 
public was present, if only the 60.000 
spectators who paid to enter the memorial 
grounds or the 27.000 school children lining 
the parade route to and from the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal. Photos taken during 
the day attest to the presence of throngs of 
spectators.29 As in France, festive programs, 
street theatre, music and fireworks were 
organized to draw a large public and fill time 
before and after the actual arrival of the head 
of State. The essential difference resides in 
the relationship between the three main 
protagonists who intervene in the production 
of a discourse on the public during such 
events: the head of State, the crowd and 
journalists covering the event. 
 In France, representatives of the 
national press were organized in a “pool” and 
followed the president on his trips though the 
country. During parades, they immediately 
followed the President’s carriage and shared 
the stage or tribune where the President 
greeted crowds, thereby sharing his point of 
view, thereby seeing and hearing a never 
ending series of acclamations and clamours as 
the President walked or drove through 
different streets and neighbourhoods. In 
Leipzig, the press was excluded from the 
banquet and, contrary to the French example, 
was not allowed to follow the Kaiser and his 
entourage on the official parade route or on 
the official tribune during the inauguration 
ceremony. For this reason, the point of 
                                                 
29
 Even the Leipziger Volkszeitung had to admit that 
large numbers of people had turned out, but insisted on 
the manipulation of the public and on the fact that 
judging by the accents of the members of the public, 
few were “authentic” inhabitants of the city, considered 
a bastion of the SPD. 
observation of the journalists is the same as of 
the ordinary spectator and attention is centred 
on the Kaiser. In France, the journalist “saw” 
the event through the eyes of the President 
and relate what the President was shown, 
what he heard, and therefore conveyed greater 
attention to the “flavour” of the locality. 
The first rough conclusions obtained 
from this initial level of comparison- based on 
a classic comparative “checklist” approach- 
run against the grain of some of the common 
assumptions deeply entrenched in perceptions 
of German and French history. The different 
“items” covered so far tend to show that, 
contrary to what one commonly thinks about 
French Jacobin centralism and the strong 
autonomy of German cities and Länder (i.e., 
their Selbstverwaltung), the scope for 
negotiation by local representatives and the 
visibility of the locality in visits of 
sovereignty is much more restrained in 
Germany. In addition “civil society”, 
traditionally thought to be extremely weak in 
France, is much more evident there than in the 
visits in Germany, despite the density and 
activity of its social organizations. At the 
same time, it was shown that the practical 
organization of the events produced differing 
accounts of the visits and that care must be 
taken to reconstruct the mechanisms which 
create particular points of observation in order 
to correctly interpret the sources. These 
conclusions are the first step, however, and 
explaining the empirical observations now 
moves to the fore. What registers of 
explanation can be mobilized to understand 
these apparently paradoxical differences? 
How can the knowledge gained through the 
comparison feedback and provoke a 
modification of the initial “French” categories 
of analysis, which were used to “read” the 
event in Leipzig? 
 
 
II - The limits of an interpretation 
based on German “absences” 
 
In the first phase, the collection of 
information, the description and the 
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interpretation of the German case were carried 
out using a yardstick initially developed for 
the French case. The itemized comparison 
provided for a number of surprises, less in 
terms of the findings, than in terms of what 
was not found in the German case- that is, 
“absences”- which did not appear to be 
attributable to gaps in the sources. Two 
interpretative models seemed to lend 
themselves well to explaining what was not 
taking place in Germany, but “should have” 
been, according to the initial framework: first, 
the “late” democratization of German society; 
and second, the particular position and 
strategy of the imperial court. These 
interpretations seemed plausible, as they 
corresponded to cognitive frameworks 
routinely mobilized to compare the two 
nations. As we will show, however, these 
rather convenient frameworks do not stand up 
to a closer examination, especially when the 
transposability of categories of analysis is 
brought under closer scrutiny. 
 
Germany as a latecomer to political 
modernity? 
 
One can begin by exploring the weak 
involvement of local organizations in the 
planning of the Leipzig visit, which seems 
quite surprising given the strength and 
vivacity of German social organizations at the 
time (Nipperdey 1986: 172-185). In addition, 
there is the question of why so little was done 
by the organizers to celebrate the territory and 
its population on the occasion of the Kaiser’s 
visit, and thereby recognize its unique 
contributions to the nation. If one compares 
the time of exposure to the public and the 
journalistic accounts of gestures by the head 
of State, again the German case presents a 
series of absences. The appearance in public 
is kept to a strict minimum and contrary to 
French journalistic accounts where the 
President acknowledges the warm welcome 
(by greeting at the balcony, waving to crowds, 
etc…) there are no such accounts on the 
German side on October 19, 1913.30 The 
temptation is to see these “absences” in 
evolutionary terms, as a partial- yet 
incomplete- opening of hereditary legitimacy 
to the need to build and measure popular 
legitimacy in an age of numbers-based 
politics (Desrosières 1993). The increasingly 
public nature of visits between royal families 
documented by Johannes Paulmann and the 
transformations of the regular visits of the 
Kaiser to preside over military manoeuvres 
between 1876 and 1914 demonstrate the ever-
greater attention paid to the transformation of 
court ritual into public events. Both in Berlin 
and in his regular visits to military districts, 
Wilhelm II transformed military manoeuvres 
into highly public affairs, innovating in 1888 
by crossing the centre of Berlin at the head of 
his regiments on the way to the exercise 
grounds and creating the imposing sight of the 
Kaiser on horseback at the head of well-
drilled regiments which attracted thousands. 
In this framework, the absences on the 
German side made visible by comparison 
with the French case (the “distance” from the 
public and the military rigidity of the Kaiser, 
etc) would suggest that the importance of 
numbers was still incompletely understood or 
hampered by court ritual or rigid social 
hierarchies imposed by hereditary 
legitimisation, therefore “lagging” a few 
decades behind France where the head of 
State was first and foremost elected (if 
indirectly), derived his mandate from citizens 
and the presidential institution had several 
decades of accumulated know-how in the 
regulation of the symbolic distance between 
ruler and ruled. In keeping with this line of 
argumentation, one can note that presidential 
visits by Paul von Hindenburg in the 1920s 
appear to comply with a much greater extent 
to the French “model.” During his official 
visits, von Hindenburg visited the main 
attractions and sites of each city, increased the 
number of forays into different 
                                                 
30
 Thomas Lindenberger found only one documented 
case in Berlin where the Kaiser greeted a crowd and 
gave a short speech following the electoral victory of 
the Bülow block in 1907 (Lindenberger 1995: 365).  
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neighbourhoods, visited important economic 
and historical sites and places of interest, 
increased direct physical contact with selected 
members of local society or children, and 
“spontaneously” greeted crowds.31 In 
contrast, few of these features, which we find 
systematically in French presidential visits as 
of the late 1880s, formed a regular part of the 
repertoire of Wilhelm II’s public appearances 
in journeys to regions outside Berlin.32 
This interpretation, which mirrors 
ordinary representations of the “lateness” of 
democratic culture in Germany, is not without 
foundation, but appears in this case to be 
largely due to an illusion produced by the 
asymmetry of the comparison, as we will 
demonstrate below.33 Moreover, the 
interpretation linking the transformation of 
the German visits over time and their apparent 
stylistic convergence with French presidential 
visits after 1919 relies on the relatively 
unsound functionalist assumption of a 
homology between the form of legitimisation 
of political authority, and how the 
local/regional articulates with the national. 
Even if the comparison has shown differences 
in the mechanics of the visits of sovereignty 
prior to World War I, the fact remains that 
both heads of State, whether elected or 
hereditary, pursue an identical objective: the 
creation and reinforcement of an emotional 
link between the national and the local 
through the mediation of the peripatetic head 
of State. 
                                                 
31
 Reichspräsident von Hindenburg auf der Leipziger 
Frühjahrsmesse (Leipzig 1926); Reichspräsident von 
Hindenburg: Besuch in Hamburg am 4.5.1926. 
(Hamburg 1926). 
32
 The Kaiser did frequently inaugurate monuments, 
visited public buildings of note or launch ships during 
his visits throughout the Reich but these trips were 
much less a celebration of local or regional 
contributions to the nation and interactions between the 
Kaiser and the public seemed to be much more 
distanced than in the French case. 
33
 Suffice it to note for now that if we had focused on 
criticism of presidential visits in France, the “advance” 
of France would not be so apparent, as articles in 
socialist newspapers stigmatized the “princes of the 
Third Republic who increasingly play at being kings 
and emperors.” The Droit du Peuple commenting on 
the visit of Poincaré in the Somme on July 29, 1913. 
 
A “strategic” interpretation? 
 
One can just as well make a case for another 
radically different interpretation, more 
intentionalist in nature, by drawing on the 
historical rivalry between Prussia and Saxony 
as an explanation for the failure of the 
imperial court to encourage and recognize 
local initiatives, evident in the Leipzig visit of 
1913. Several elements would support such an 
interpretation. Wilhelm II came to Leipzig to 
commemorate the centenary of the battle that 
had liberated the German states from 
Napoleonic rule. The ceremony was designed 
by the imperial court to demonstrate the 
attachment of Saxony to the Reich and to 
celebrate the centrality of the Hohenzollern 
dynasty in the construction of the German 
nation. With the exception of the social-
democratic press, however, the numerous 
brochures, articles and other accounts of the 
1913 event, as well as texts analyzing the 
“lessons of the battle” which were published 
in supplements, omit the essential facts that a 
number of Saxon generals had fought 
alongside the French in 1813, and that it was 
the defeat of Napoleon in Leipzig that 
definitively placed Saxony under Prussian 
hegemony.34 This taboo subject, if rarely 
mentioned by the organizers of the imperial 
visit explicitly, was nonetheless in the back of 
everybody’s mind. The representative of the 
imperial court addressed this very question in 
an initial series of correspondence in 
December 1911, stating that the visit must be 
“a national moment which must not at the 
same time infringe upon the honour of 
Saxony.”35 But the imperial court made no 
particular effort to honour or emphasize the 
contributions of Leipzig or Saxony to the 
edification of the German nation. The king of 
Saxony, Friedrich-August, is hardly 
                                                 
34
 The Leipziger Volkszeitung, in particular published a 
series of articles poking fun at the “historical 
falsifications,” and published a long article to 
“reestablish historical truth” on the front page of its 
edition of October 16, 1913, recalling in great detail 
how Saxony rallied behind Napoleon. 
35
 MA Leipzig, STaL, Kap 71/ 63/1. 
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mentioned in journalistic accounts of the day, 
and the three speeches held during the 
inauguration remained exclusively national in 
scope. 
The general impression conveyed was 
thus of a head of State visiting a conquered 
territory, an impression reinforced by a 
controversy surrounding the protocol of the 
official parade heading to the inauguration. In 
an initial proposal by the imperial court, an 
Uhlan company was to precede and follow a 
suite of carriages carrying the Emperor, the 
King of Saxony, representatives of foreign 
royal houses and the Mayor of Leipzig. Three 
weeks before the event, however, the court 
informed the Mayor that he was to follow 
behind the Uhlans. The mayor protested, 
without success, in the following terms: 
 
“In your previous correspondence concerning 
the official parade, I noted some important 
changes [….] These changes are contrary to 
tradition in Leipzig and in Saxony [….] It would 
give the unfortunate impression to the 
population that representatives of the civil 
institutions will be less present for this 
important event, and this would be a serious 
blow to their prestige.”36 
 
Not only were no concessions made to 
recognize or honour local customs and 
traditions; none were made to the civil elites 
either. Unlike Dresden, the capital of Saxony 
and residence of the Saxon monarchy, Leipzig 
was politically and economically dominated 
by a liberal-national bourgeoisie. The 
symbolic marginalization of the Mayor 
paralleled the decision not to visit the sites 
symbolizing the power of this bourgeoisie, 
including the building exposition, the new 
town hall, the new national library, and the 
municipal theatre. These decisions 
represented a symbolic blow both to the city 
in its rivalry with Dresden and Berlin and, 
indirectly, to the contributions of the 
bourgeoisie to the construction of the German 
nation. 
The organization of the Leipzig visit can 
therefore be interpreted as an operation by 
                                                 
36
 Letter from Dittrich to von Burgsdorff  9/23/1913. 
AM Leipzig, STaL, Kap 71/ 63/1. 
means of which Kaiser and court sought to 
symbolically rewrite the past by downplaying 
interpretations of the battle of 1813 as a war 
of popular national liberation which the King 
of Prussia reluctantly followed by placing the 
Hohenzollern dynasty and Prussia at the heart 
of German unity. This interpretation holds up 
to a comparison with the very different 
celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
battle in 1863, which placed war veterans and 
the national-liberal patriotic movements at the 
centre of the festivities. While in 1863 some 
20.000 veterans and members of patriotic 
associations had marched in the streets of the 
city before a crowd of 100,000 spectators and 
propagated the slogan “einig Volk von 
Brüdern” (Hoffmann 1995: 118); in 1913, 
they were relegated to the role of spectators, 
excluded from the official parade route, now 
reserved for the Imperial court, its guests and 
a handful of national political and military 
figures. At most, the standard bearers of these 
organizations were “reviewed” by the Kaiser, 
placing them in an explicitly subservient 
position vis-à-vis Wilhelm II. 
Another example of ceremonial 
symbolism which could have celebrated the 
city and region, but was subverted in the 
interests of Imperial centralization reinforces 
this interpretation. In October 1913, 17,000 
bicyclists and runners relayed messages from 
all corners of the Reich and beyond (including 
from Memel, Stralsund, Flensburg, Waterloo, 
Strasbourg, Friedrichshafen) and converged 
on Leipzig on the 18th. Although the Kaiser 
was handed the messages at the end of the 
official ceremony, they went unread, and the 
athletic and organizational feat, drawing a 
symbolic border of the nation around and into 
Leipzig, national capital for a day, was barely 
mentioned in journalistic accounts of the 
day’s events. One can hypothesize that the 
messages remained underutilized because the 
exploit would diminish the place of the 
Kaiser, by emphasizing the role of the people 
in the construction of the nation, on a day 
which was intended to place the role of 
Prussia and its ruling family centre stage. 
This brings us to consider the problems 
linked with the mechanical transposition of 
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the initial theoretical framework. Above all, 
the scale of analysis remains problematic, as 
the signifier “local” or “periphery” does not 
reflect the same reality in the two contexts. In 
the French case, the petites patries and the 
city are the essential frames of reference of 
the action and popular mobilization, while in 
the German case, the city is simply a 
backdrop to be crossed to get from point A to 
point B, and the pertinent territorial unit 
which structures the relationship between 
centre and periphery is not the city but, in 
fact, the Land. As a result, our attempts to 
map out the routes taken by heads of state on 
the scale of a city produces the appearance of 
a fixed frame of reference for comparison, but 
this comparison misses the essential realities 
of the German visit and produces an artefact 
which misses the historical specificity of the 
articulation between the centre and the 
periphery. We can illustrate this distortion by 
imagining for an instant a reversal of the 
asymmetry of our comparison, by viewing the 
French visits from a German perspective. In 
this case, using the region or even the 
département as the essential geographic and 
social frame of reference would obscure the 
essential point of the Presidential visits in 




III - France to Germany and back 
 
The blending out of the regional scale 
produced by transposing analytical categories 
forged in France also carried with it a failure 
to integrate the military dimension of the visit 
and the role of Wilhelm II as head of the 
army. Indeed, when looking carefully at the 
events—and even if the army is not explicitly 
at the heart of the visit to Leipzig in 1913—
the structure of the visit appears indexed to 
the trips the Kaiser made regularly to direct 
manoeuvres in Germany’s fifteen military 
districts. The court organizers of the Leipzig 
visit simply transposed this routine to the 
events of October 18th. This allows for a new 
understanding of why the court did not 
accommodate local wishes, without having to 
resort to ad hoc theorizing about the 
intentions of the organizers of the visit such 
as the wish to somehow “punish” or assert 
hegemony over Saxony. For both in Berlin 
and in his regular visits to military districts, 
Wilhelm II transformed military manoeuvres 
into highly public affaires, innovating in 1888 
by crossing the centre of the Berlin at the 
head of his regiments on the way to the 
exercise grounds. But while the imposing 
sight of the Kaiser at the head of well-drilled 
regiments attracted increasingly large crowds, 
the path taken was direct and in no way 
involved “visiting” the different parts of the 
city. In other words, it was not the city being 
celebrated, rather the wide boulevards were 
merely the backdrops where the solder-
Emperor could be seen and recognized as 
head of the army. Similarly to the 
inauguration of the Völkerschlachtdenkmal, 
the military manoeuvres themselves took 
place in an enclosed space. In both cases, the 
Emperor reviewed his troops- although at the 
inauguration, the “troops” were of course the 
standard-bearers of the patriotic, student and 
veterans associations standing at attention. 
The ceremony and the manoeuvres were both 
viewed by three circles of the public, defined 
by the social and physical distance separating 
them from the Kaiser. The inner circle was 
comprised of the court and the military 
establishment; the second circle represented 
the civil elite, who paid up to 100 RM per 
person to obtain a clear view of the Kaiser 
from specially-constructed bleachers; and 
finally the third group, the general public, 
viewed the proceedings from afar, behind 
fences, barriers or police cordons (Vogel 
1997: 70-79). 
Taking into consideration the central 
importance of the military imprint on German 
official visits, and re-examining the French 
case through these lenses allows us to re-
evaluate the initial analytical framework, 
where the role of the French President as 
nominal chief of the army was only 
marginally considered. The reintegration of 
the military dimension into the French case 
generates a new understanding of the 
subjacent logic of Presidential visits. By 
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examining the reasons for the initial 
marginalization of the military dimension of 
French visits in our “model”, we can 
demonstrate how the interweaving of 
perspectives and categories of analysis can 
produce new interpretations. 
The military dimension of visits to the 
French provinces was initially analyzed as an 
institution which, alongside others, was 
designed to improve crowd turnout. This 
interpretation was based on the fact that cities 
“hosting” military manoeuvres hoped for the 
presence of the most spectacular forms of 
military prowess, most likely to draw a 
crowd. The colonial regiments, and in 
particular the famous Senegalese skirmishers 
(tirailleurs) and air-shows were the most 
sought after. The presence of the President at 
military manoeuvres appeared to be a very 
distinct form of public appearance, precisely 
because it was not inscribed in local society 
and did not celebrate the contribution of the 
local to the national construct. French heads 
of state presided over at least one such 
manoeuvre per year, and Poincaré was present 
at three in 1913. The scenography was 
particularly “de-territorialized,” in that it most 
often took place on grounds closed to the 
general public, most often near or within a 
military base, where references to the specific 
nature of the region or locality were fully 
neutralized. In this sense, the imposing 
parades and troop reviews seemed to be 
ceremonially distinct from presidential visits 
which exalted local particularities. As a result, 
the military dimensions of presidential visits 
and, above all, their role in articulating the 
national and the local, went largely unseen. 
By reconsidering the object after a 
“return” from the German case, however, it 
becomes possible to perceive the essential 
role played by the military in the grammar of 
Presidential visits to the provinces, precisely 
because the parades and troop reviews in no 
way depended upon their geographic 
localization. In this sense, these exercises 
underscore very different symbolic 
dimensions from the provincial visits, being 
used to designate the universalized conception 
of the nation, identically transposable from 
one place or time to another.37 Because these 
military parades and reviews could be held 
anywhere, they represent the unifying 
principal which tied the petites patries 
together, despite their diversity. The 
homogeneity of the national, expressed 
through routine military manoeuvres, thereby 
provided a symbolic counterweight to the 
singularity of each territory. The same 
uniforms, the same music and the same 
marches as all adult males had experienced, 
helped materialize the ties between the 
members of a same nation, regardless of 
specific local traditions and cultures. 
Seen in this light, military parades and 
manoeuvres in France can be integrated into 
our analysis alongside other parts of the 
official visits, such as official receptions. Like 
the parades, the receptions were organized 
according to a codified national protocol, 
giving the same ordered and harmonious 
image of the authority of the State in each 
territory. If each town was different, official 
positions were everywhere the same, from the 
Prefect and nationally elected representatives, 
down to local civil servants, and these 
functions were independent of the identity of 
their holder and the territory in which they 
were deployed. Their function as “national 
unifiers” perhaps explains why official 
receptions and military activities were 
described by the national press in such minute 
detail, with descriptions of each regiment, and 
each guest at official receptions filling page 
upon page of press accounts, thereby 
underlining the national significance of the 
visits to the general public and contributing to 
a sense of national unity. If we now return 
once again to the German case, the role of the 
military in the organization of imperial visits 
now takes on a more nuanced character. For 
when he visited military districts for 
manoeuvres, Wilhelm II would always don 
                                                 
37
 The paradigmatic example would be the liturgical 
instruments of churches, whose institutional objective 
is to allow all believers, wherever they are from, to 
partake in institutionalised practices. In other words, 
symbols make it possible to allow beliefs and religious 
practice to be exercised regardless of the local 
conditions where they are exercised. 
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the medals and military insignia belonging to 
the particular military traditions of each 
Land.38 But if the Kaiser recognized the 
regional traditions of the German army in 
such a way, it was because these identifying 
elements were inserted into a national 
institution that already existed. If, during his 
visit to Leipzig, the Kaiser refused to adopt 
any outward sign recognizing Saxony or the 
city, one can surmise that it was in part for the 
historical and strategic reasons previously 
discussed; doing so would imply recognizing 
the controversial role of Saxony and its 
people in the process of unification on a day 
which required, from the imperial court’s 
point of view, that Prussia and the 






Through the repeated shuttling between our 
two research contexts, the inquiry was able to 
transform the biases of its asymmetric initial 
structure into an instrument for producing 
new knowledge and interpretations. Instead of 
rigidly adhering preordained categories of 
analysis, the reflexive use of the asymmetry 
facilitated the inflection and transformation of 
the initial framework of analysis. We first 
established that the organizers of the French 
and German visits of sovereignty had similar 
objectives and were confronted with similar 
practical problems of organization and 
mobilization. The visits were then analyzed as 
a form of articulation between the national 
and the local, and between the political and 
                                                 
38
 One of the traditional characteristics of the German 
military, through the Second World War was that it 
was organized along “regional lines” as a way to 
perpetuate military traditions, but most of all to 
reinforce the cohesion of the battalions. This 
regionalized organization became the heart of the 
famous theory of “primary groups” in the army, which 
was used to explain the resistance of the Wehrmacht on 
the Eastern Front during the Second World War, 
despite staggering losses and the desperate situation in 
the last two years of hostilities. See Shils/Janowitz 
1948: 280-315. For a critical discussion of this theory, 
see Bartov 1991 (chapter 2). 
the social, and finally as an institution which 
contributed to the transformation of these 
relations. In both cases, the organizers sought 
to maximize the chances of success,39 and 
used time-tested and routinized organizational 
schemes to do so. 
In Germany, the regularly held military 
manoeuvres overseen by Wilhelm II 
constituted a matrix that was transposed onto 
other types of visits. Accordingly, 
organization centred on the military, which 
represented an essential bond between the 
different territories and populations making 
up the nation. The success of the visit 
depended little on the initiatives of local 
politicians, elites or associations, resulting in 
events in which the celebration of the unique 
nature of local society was kept to a 
minimum. In contrast, the visits of French 
Presidents followed a “horizontal” logic, in 
which each petite patrie was recognized in its 
singularity, but all were treated on an equal 
basis. For the head of state, the multiplication 
of such visits, always following a similar 
pattern despite regional differences, unified 
variety among the petites patries in an 
idealized representation of the nation. 
Our “detour” back through the German 
case then allowed us to reconsider the 
importance of the military in the structure of 
French presidential visits. Similarly to official 
receptions, military parades and reviews 
functioned as unifying institutions. Although 
these were not considered in and of 
themselves at first, revisiting them added a 
new dimension to our analysis, namely, the 
“vertical” integration through the military 
institution which tangibly linked together the 
petites patries of the nation. Despite their 
concerned acceptance of local initiatives, 
therefore, French presidential visits 
participated directly in the inscription of the 
national within the local. For the visits of the 
head of state, local folklore organizations, 
                                                 
39
 For example, the construction of institutional 
charisma, crowd mobilization, ensuring a warm 
welcome for the head of state, but also avoid 
uncontrolled crowd movements or behaviour, socialize 
populations and in particular children to recognize the 
authority of the state… 
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history societies and gastronomic specialists 
of the region worked hand in hand with the 
municipality and were rarely reined in when 
taking initiatives of their own. Indeed, such 
organizations could even exert a certain 
pressure on political elites, as their 
participation was considered essential in 
giving the event a special touch, the “local 
colour” necessary to effect a sensorial 
transformation of the city and thereby 
underline the extraordinary nature of the day. 
To return to the German example in 
conclusion, over the last decade or so 
historiography has shown how the idea of 
Heimat—as carried and disseminated by a 
large number of associations and 
movements—contributed to the inscription of 
the national within local and regional 
environments (Applegate 1990; 1999: 1157-
1182). The 1913 visit of Wilhelm II to 
Leipzig does not resonate with movements 
promoting the idea of Heimat that 
emphatically contributed to articulating local, 
with regional and national memories after 
German unification, however (Confino 1997: 
114). While in France municipalities helped 
finance theatre productions, concerts and local 
folklore demonstrations before and after the 
official visit, in 1913 Leipzig refused to 
financially support popular theatre 
representations of the battle of 1813 or 
brochures written by local historians or 
authors. In addition, the imperial court made 
no concessions to particular characteristics of 
the city and Saxony, as we have amply 
demonstrated. The relatively weak territorial 
articulation this demonstrates can, of course, 
be interpreted as the result of a problematic 
historical relationship between Saxony and 
Prussia, or as a sign of an incomplete national 
integration. But these hypotheses are difficult 
to verify, and it appears more fruitful to 
analyze these differences in terms of the 
practical expectations and organizational 
know-how of the main actors. 
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